This Internet Appendix examines the robustness of our main ndings and presents estimation results that are referenced but not included in the main paper. In Section I we report summary statistics for the corporate bond oerings analyzed in the main paper. We assess the robustness of our main ndings when we exclude oerings with possible underpricing measurement error in Section II or when we use an alternative information production proxy in Section III. We discuss the correlations among our independent variables in Section IV. We examine whether our ndings are robust in an alternative sample of insurers with potential demand for new oerings in Section V. We repeat our main tests for all insurers, rather than for only those that are active primary market participants, in Section VI and for non-investment-grade oerings, rather than for investment-grade oerings, in Section VII. In Section VIII we investigate whether an insurer's information production and trading relationship with an oering's lead underwriters impact the probability of receiving an allocation in the oering and the magnitude of that allocation. We assess the robustness of our main ndings to alternative standard-error clustering and alternative xed-eect controls in Section IX, and to including in the set of explanatory variables proxies for other insurer-underwriter relationships in Section X. We account for potential multicollinearity in Section XI. We conduct various subsample analyses in Section XII. Lastly, we consider alternative proxies for the severity of the issuer-underwriter agency problem in Section XIII.
I Oering summary statistics
In this section we present summary statistics for the 5,341 investment-grade (IG) and 714 non-IG corporate bond oerings, analyzed in the main paper. These statistics, reported in Table A1 of this Internet Appendix, indicate that insurers are less likely to participate in non-IG oerings.
As a result of insurers' larger allocations in IG than non-IG oerings, the average aggregate rstday prots from IG oerings are also larger ($308 thousand versus $211 thousand per oering), despite IG oerings being underpriced less (32.08 bps versus 75.47 bps). 1 The statistics in Table A1 also show that IG oerings, compared to non-IG oerings, have longer maturity (12 years versus 9 years) and larger oering amount ($659 million versus $545 million). About 4% (6%) of IG (non-IG) oerings are issued by rst-time bond issuers and 28% (29%) are issued by private rms.
II Excluding oerings with possible underpricing measurement error An oering's underpricing is meant to reect the dierence between the price at which the oering is sold to investors in the primary market, and the oering's true value and thus fair oering price. Measures of underpricing typically use a secondary market price as a proxy for the fair oering price. As described in the main paper, we follow this approach and estimate a corporate bond oering's underpricing as in Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) . In particular, we use the volume-weighted average at price from the secondary market on the rst day (within a week of issuance) on which the bond trades as the proxy for the bond's fair oering price. However, this approach may result in underpricing measurement error under two circumstances. First, 21% of IG bond oerings in our sample do not trade on the oering date. While we adjust these bonds' secondary market price for market-wide movements from the oering date to the rst trading date, the price may still reect changes in issuer fundamentals in the few days following the oering, and may therefore be a noisy proxy of the fair oering price. Second, even when a bond trades on the oering date, if that date is characterized by large interest-rate changes then the bond's secondary market price will reect these market-wide movements and may again be a noisy proxy for the bond's fair oering price.
In this section, we assess the robustness of our main ndings to excluding from the sample oerings for which underpricing may be measured with error for the two reasons above. The results from an OLS estimation of our baseline specication are reported in Table A2 of this Internet Appendix. In column (1) we exclude from the sample bonds with no secondary market trading on the oering date. In columns (2) and (3) we exclude bonds issued on days characterized by large interest-rate changes, which we dene as daily change of the ten-year Treasury yield is outside the 595 percentile or 199 percentile, respectively, of the yield-change distribution over the 7/1/2002 12/31/2014 period. The results in Table A2 are very similar to those reported in column (1) of Table 5 in the main paper and suggest that underpricing measurement errors do not aect our main ndings.
III Alternative information production proxy
In this section, we assess the robustness of our ndings when we use an alternative information production proxy. In the main paper, our proxy is based on an insurer's industry expertise. As an alternative, we construct a measure of the insurer's issuer rather than industry expertise. In particular, we identify all other bonds of the issuer of the new oering using data from Mergent's FISD. We then calculate the percent of an insurer's corporate-bond holdings of the same issuer at the year-end prior to the oering. We use the resultant variable, Info Prod Issuer, instead of or in addition to Info Prod in the OLS estimation of our baseline specication. The estimation results, presented in Table A3 of this Internet Appendix, suggest that an insurer's issuer expertise is economically a less important determinant of its rst-day prots than its industry expertise. More importantly, the joint economic impact of both the insurer's industry and issuer expertise is still smaller than that of the insurer's trading relationship with the underwriters.
IV Correlations among independent variables
In Table A4 we report the Pearson correlations among the independent variables included in our baseline specication, Eq. (3) in the main paper. The table indicates that the correlation between our proxies for information production and trading relationship, Info Prod and Trd Rel, is low (−0.024). Since the correlation between Trd Rel and Ln(Hldg) is high, in Section XI of this Internet Appendix we examine the robustness of our ndings to orthogonalizing Trd Rel on Ln(Hldg).
V Insurers with revealed demand
In the main paper we focus our analyses on the subset of insurers that are regular primary market participants. One reason for this empirical choice is that we have no information on insurers'
indications of interest (IOIs) in an oering, so we are unable to unambiguously determine whether an insurer without an allocation did not request one, or requested one but did not receive an allocation.
Presumably, insurers who regularly receive allocations are more likely to have participated in the bookbuilding process and submitted an IOI. An alternative way to identify the subset of insurers who have likely submitted an IOI is to focus on those with revealed demand for the oering, i.e., insurers who receive an allocation in the primary market or purchase the bond in the secondary market in the 30, 60, or 90 days after the oering.
We estimate our baseline specication in these alternative samples and present the results in Table A5 of this Internet Appendix. The results are broadly similar to those reported in column (1) of Table 5 in the main paper. Thus, our ndings appear robust to the approach used to identify the likely participants in the bookbuilding process for an oering.
VI Including all insurers
In this section, we assess the robustness of our main ndings to including in the sample all insurers interested in investing in corporate bonds rather than only those that are regular primary market participants. We identify insurers interested in investing in corporate bonds based on insurers' holdings and purchases. Specically, we expand the sample to insurers that hold at least $1 million of corporate debt securities and at least 50 xed-income securities at the beginning of the oering year, and purchase (in the primary or secondary market) at least $1 million of corporate bonds during the oering year. This sample construction approach produces 3,952,499 insureroering observations. We replicate the analyses, whose results are presented in Table 5 in the main paper, using this alternative sample. We cannot replicate the quantile regression analysis at the 90th percentile, since now only 2.6% of the observations are of insurers with non-zero allocations.
The estimation results are presented in Table A6 of this Internet Appendix. As in Table 5 in the main paper, in column (1) of Table A6 both Info Prod and Trd Rel carry positive and statistically signicant coecients, and the coecient of Trd Rel is multiple times that of Info Prod. The coecients of both proxies are smaller than in the sample of regular primary market participants, likely because this alternative sample includes many insurers that never receive an allocation but also never request one. The estimation results for underpriced and overpriced oerings, reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table A6 respectively, are again consistent with those presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 in the main paper. Even in this larger sample, investors who produce more information and have a stronger trading relationship cannot manage to avoid rst-day losses from overpriced oerings, but their gains are still larger than their losses. Finally, as in the main paper, controlling for unobservable insurer characteristics though insurer xed eects in column (4) of Table A6 , leaves our conclusions unchanged.
VII Analyses of non-investment-grade oerings
In the main paper, we focus our analyses on insurers' allocations in IG corporate bond oerings, because as a group insurers are not major investors in non-IG bonds. Indeed, Table A1 of this Internet Appendix shows that lead underwriters allocate to insurers only 6.35% of the par value in non-IG oerings compared to 17.36% of the par value in IG oerings. This makes it dicult to generalize our ndings about lead underwriters' allocation practices of non-IG bonds among insurers to their allocation practices of non-IG bonds among institutional investors as a whole.
Nonetheless, for completeness, in this section we examine the determinants of rst-day prots among the 714 non-IG oerings that pass our sample selection criteria. The baseline results for all non-IG oerings are reported in column (1) of Table A7 . While both Info Prod and Trd Rel carry positive and statistically signicant coecients, the coecient of Trd Rel is ten times that of Info Prod. In column (2) we present the estimation results from a quantile regression. For an insurer at the 90th percentile of the rst-day prots distribution, we nd support only for the trading relationship hypothesis. The coecient on Trd Rel is 6.280 in column (2) compared to 2.332 in column (1), which suggests that an insurer, whose prots from underpriced non-IG oerings are already signicant, can benet much more from strengthening its trading relationship with an oering's lead underwriters than the average insurer in our sample. The estimation results for underpriced and overpriced oerings are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table A7 , respectively.
Trd Rel remains signicant in both samples and Info Prod loses its signicance in overpriced non-IG oerings. The estimation results with insurer xed eects, reported in column (5), suggest that even when controlling for unobservable insurer characteristics, an increase in an insurer's trading relationship with the oering's lead underwriters brings more protable allocations. The overall conclusion from the non-IG analyses in this section is the same as from the IG analyses in the main paper a strong trading relationship with the oering's lead underwriters, and to a lesser extent information production, importantly impact the rst-day prots an insurer receives.
VIII Determinants of primary market allocations
In this section we examine whether an insurer's information production and trading relationship with an oering's underwriters impact the probability that the insurer receives an allocation in the oering and the magnitude of that allocation. To do so, we specify the following models:
where i is a bond, j is an insurer, t is a year, and k is the bond issuer's industry. Has Allocation is an indicator variable equal to one if an insurer receives an allocation from an oering's lead underwriters, zero otherwise. Allocation is the fraction (in bps) of an oering's par value allocated to an insurer from the oering's lead underwriters. We estimate Eq. (A1) using a probit model and Eq. (A2) using a tobit model.
The estimation results, reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table A8 respectively, indicate that Info Prod and Trd Rel are important determinants of whether an insurer receives a primary market allocation and how large that allocation is. The estimated coecients on both variables are positive and strongly signicant, which suggests that the probability and magnitude of an insurer's primary market allocation increase with more information production during the bookbuilding process and stronger trading relationship with an oering's lead underwriters. The economic impact of a stronger trading relationship is larger than that of information production. These ndings closely parallel those in the main paper, where we show that an insurer's rst-day prots are more closely related to its trading relationship with the lead underwriters than with its information production.
IX Alternative standard-error clustering and xed-eect controls
In this section, we investigate whether our main ndings are robust to alternative standard-error clustering and to alternative xed-eect controls. In all estimations in the main paper we cluster the standard errors at the oering level. Since a large number of issuers have multiple oerings in the sample, to account for the possibility that observations for the same issuer may not be independent, as an alternative we cluster the standard errors at the issuer level. The results are reported in column (1) of Table A9 in this Internet Appendix and are very similar to those reported in column
(1) of Table 5 in the main paper. To control for unobservable oering or issuer characteristics that may aect our ndings, we estimate Eq. (3) in the main paper with oering xed eects or issuer xed eects. When we control for oering xed eects, we exclude from the specication all static oering characteristics (Ln(Maturity, Ln(Amount), DIPO, Private, Rating FE, Year FE, and Industry FE ), and when we control for issuer xed eects we exclude static issuer characteristics (Industry FE ). The results, presented in columns (2) and (3) of Table A9 in this Internet Appendix, again remain largely unchanged from those reported in column (1) of Table 5 in the main paper.
X Other insurer-underwriter relationships
In the main paper, we focus our analyses on whether insurers' prior trading with an oering's lead underwriters helps them obtain more protable allocations. In this section, we investigate whether rst-day prots are also related to other insurer-underwriter relationships. First, we examine if underwriters award some insurers more protable allocations as a way of attracting these insurers' future trading business. In particular, we explore whether an insurer's rst-day prots increase with its future, in addition to its past, proportional trading with an oering's underwriters. give some investors more protable allocations not only to reward them for past trading business but also, to a lesser extent, to win their future trading business. This nding is consistent with that of Jenkinson, Jones, and Suntheim (2018) for the equity IPO market.
Next, we examine whether underwriters use protable allocations to reward insurers for their underwriting business. Specically, we investigate whether insurers, whose own bonds have been underwritten by an oering's underwriters, obtain more of the oering's rst-day prots. We construct two indicator variables, Trd Rel UW1Y and Trd Rel UW3Y, equal to one if an oering's lead underwriters have brought to the market a bond oering of the insurer in the prior one or three years respectively, zero otherwise. We then estimate Eq. (3) in the main paper with either of the indicators included and present the results in columns (2) and (3) of Table A11 and are broadly similar to those in column (1) of Table 5 in the main paper.
We also investigate whether our main ndings are sensitive to our choice of proxy for an insurer's demand for corporate bonds. Instead of portfolio holdings, the proxy we use in the main paper, Table 5 in the main paper, which suggests that our main ndings are not limited to the subset of active insurer traders.
Third, we examine whether corporate bond oerings that are relatively more dicult for underwriters to place are responsible for our ndings. Underwriting extremely large bond oerings (mega-bonds) or oerings issued on a compressed timeline (accelerated oerings) may be challenging because it requires nding a large number of bond investors to absorb the oerings (Helwege and Wang, 2019) or nding enough interest in the new bonds within a short time frame, respectively.
Underwriters may underprice such oerings more in an attempt to attract a sucient number of investors. They may also attempt to minimize their investor search costs by placing a larger proportion of an oering with their best clients. This reasoning may explain the positive association between an insurer's rst-day prots and its trading relationship with underwriters documented in the main paper.
To investigate whether mega-bonds and accelerated oerings are driving our results, we exclude them from the sample and re-estimate our baseline specication. We classify as mega-bonds the largest 5% of sample bonds based on oering amount. 2 We identify accelerated oerings using two approaches. We begin by searching through the SEC's EDGAR system for registration statements (Form S-1, S-1/A, S-3, S-3/A, or S-3ASR) that include debt securities and that are led during the three years prior to each oering's issuance date. 3 We then retrieve the latest ling date among these registration statements for each oering. Our rst denition of an accelerated oering follows Gao and Ritter (2010) and classies a bond oering as accelerated if its issuance date is within three days of the latest ling date. Our second approach to identifying accelerated oerings relies on the existence of an active Form S-3ASR prior to the oering's issuance. Registration statements of well-known seasoned issuers led on Form S-3ASR, commonly referred to as automatic shelf 2 Consistent with Helwege and Wang (2019), we show that extremely large bond oerings are signicantly more underpriced than smaller ones. The 245 oerings that are among the largest 5% based on oering amount have average underpricing of 42 bps and average oering amount of $2.6 billion. This implies that these large oerings account for 24% (=(0.0042 × 2.6 × 245)/(0.0032 × 0.659 × 5, 341)) of rst-day prots in our sample. 3 We are able to nd registration statements for 4,332 oerings in our sample.
registrations, become eective immediately upon ling without an SEC review. Thus, automatic shelf registrations allow issuers to raise bond nancing on a signicantly compressed timeline (Musto and Popadak, 2016) . Our second denition of accelerated oerings accounts for the possibility that bond issuers take advantage of automatic shelf registrations' immediate eectiveness and assumes that all bond oerings of issuers with an active Form S-3ASR are accelerated even if the issuance date is not within three days of the latest ling date. While our rst denition may underestimate the number of accelerated oerings in our sample, our second denition may overestimate it. By assessing the robustness of our ndings using both denitions, we are able to identify the range of the eect of interest among non-accelerated oerings.
The results for the subsample excluding the largest 5% of oerings are reported in column (3) of Table 5 in the main paper, which conrms that our ndings are not driven by the largest oerings in the sample. When we exclude from the sample accelerated oerings, in columns (4) and (5) of Table A12 in this Internet Appendix, we similarly nd that the coecients on Info Prod and Trd Rel remain positive and signicant. Thus, our ndings are not driven by the accelerated oerings in our sample either.
XIII Alternative agency problem severity proxies
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our ndings to using alternative proxies for the severity of the issuer-underwriter agency problem. In the main paper, our two proxies are based on the issuer's number of bonds and par value issued in the ve years prior to the oering. As an alternative, we construct indicator variables based on the issuer's number of bonds and par value issued in the one or three years prior to the oering. We then re-estimate Eq. (5) using each of these four alternative Low AP indicators. The estimation results, presented in Table A13 of this Internet Appendix, are very similar to those reported in Table 7 in the main paper. Thus, our nding that underwriters' desire to win frequent corporate bond issuers' underwriting business tempers the severity of the issuer-underwriter agency problem, appears robust to alternative proxies for the severity of this problem. Table 5 in the main paper, but the sample diers. In column (1), we remove oerings that do not trade in the secondary market on the oering date. In columns (2) and (3), we remove oerings issued on days when the daily change of the ten-year Treasury yield is outside the 5 95 percentile or 199 percentile, respectively, of the yield-change distribution over the sample period. Table A5 : Determinants of rst-day prots -insurers with revealed demand This table presents the results from an analysis of rst-day prots from investment-grade corporate bond oerings. The independent variables and methodology are identical to those used to generate column (1) of Table 5 in the main paper, but the sample includes only insurers who receive an allocation in the primary market or purchase the bond in the secondary market in the 30, 60, or 90 days after issuance. Table A6 : Determinants of rst-day prots -all insurers This table presents the results from an analysis of rst-day prots from investment-grade corporate bond oerings. The independent variables and methodology are identical to those used to generate columns (1), (3), (4), and (5) of Table 5 in the main paper, but the sample includes all insurers interested in investing in corporate bonds rather than only those that are regular primary market participants. Table 5 in the main paper, but the dependent variable and econometric technique dier. In column (1), the results are from a probit model, in which the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if an insurer receives an allocation in an oering from the lead underwriters, zero otherwise. In column (2), the results are from a tobit model, in which the dependent variable is the fraction (in bps) of an oering's par value allocated to an insurer from the lead underwriters.
All
Has Allocation Allocation (1) Table 5 in the main paper, but the methodology diers. In column (1) we cluster the standard errors at the issuer level rather than at the oering level. In columns (2) and (3) Table A13 : First-day prots and the issuer-underwriter agency problem -alternative agency problem severity proxies This table presents the results from an analysis of rst-day prots from investment-grade corporate bond oerings. The sample and methodology are identical to those used to generate Table 7 in the main paper, but we use alternative proxies for the severity of the issuer-underwriter agency problem, Low AP. In column (1), Low AP is an indicator variable equal to one if the issuer's number of bonds issued in the year prior to the oering is in the top quartile for the sample, zero otherwise. In column (2), Low AP is an indicator variable equal to one if the issuer's par value of bonds issued in the year prior to the oering is in the top quartile for the sample, zero otherwise.
In column (3), Low AP is an indicator variable equal to one if the issuer's number of bonds issued in the three years prior to the oering is in the top quartile for the sample, zero otherwise. In column (4), Low AP is an indicator variable equal to one if the issuer's par value of bonds issued in the three years prior to the oering is in the top quartile for the sample, zero otherwise.
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